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Abstract
Several recent policy and academic contributions consider that liberalising prod-
uct markets would foster innovation and growth. This paper analyses the innovation-
productivity relationship at the industry-level for a sample of OECD manufacturing
industries. We pay particular attention to the vertically-induced inuence of prod-
uct market regulation (PMR) of key input sectors of the economy on the innovative
process of manufacturing and its consequences on productivity. We test for a di¤er-
entiated e¤ect of this type of PMR depending on whether countries are technological
leaders or laggards in a given industry and for a given time period. Contrary to the
most widespread policy claims, the innovation-boosting e¤ects of liberalisation poli-
cies at the leading edge are systematically not supported by the data. These ndings
question the relevance of a research and innovation policy based on liberalisation.
Keywords: product market regulation, innovation, productivity, growth
Résumé: Plusieurs contributions récentes à la littérature académique et aux dé-
bats de politique économique considèrent que la libéralisation des marchés de biens
et services favoriserait la productivité et la croissance. Ce papier analyse la rela-
tion entre innovation et productivité au niveau des branches pour un échantillon
de pays de lOCDE. Nous nous concentrons sur linuence verticale de la régle-
mentation de marchés de biens et services dans certains secteurs dinputs clés sur
linnovation et la productivité des secteurs manufacturiers. Nous testons un e¤et
di¤érencié de la réglementation dans ces secteurs clés suivant que les pays sont des
leaders ou des suiveurs technologiques dans un secteur donné pour une années don-
née. Contrairement aux prescription de politique économique les plus répandues, les
résultats empiriques ne valident en aucun cas lexistence de¤ets pro-innovation des
politiques de libéralisation pour les leaders technologiques. Ces résultats remettent
en question la pertinence dune politque de recherche et dinnovation fondée sur la
libéralisation.
Mots-clés: réglementation des marchés de biens et service, innovation, produc-
tivité, croissance
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1 Introduction
The interest in policies aiming at fostering innovative activity through framework con-
ditions has grown in Europe over the last decade, if only because restrictions on public
spending have reduced the funding of more traditional research and innovation policies
(Blind 2012). The regulatory framework has been at the centre of economic policy de-
bates and the most accepted view in economic policy circles, particularly in Europe, is
that a more intense competition should be promoted through the implementation of a
less stringent product market regulation (PMR).1 This view is not devoid of academic
grounding. Following the emergence of the innovation-based endogenous growth theory
(Aghion and Howitt, 1998), the importance of product market competition (PMC) as an
engine of growth through its e¢ciency- and innovation-inducing e¤ects has been stressed
in some theoretical and applied contributions (e.g. Aghion et al. 1997, 2005; Aghion
and Gri¢th 2005; Aghion et al. 2014). This theme has been incorporated in the policy
debates linking competition policy (or the extent of regulation in product markets) to
competitiveness and growth. Indeed [t]he view that competition and entry should pro-
mote e¢ciency and prosperity has now become a common wisdom worldwide (Aghion
and Gri¢th, 2005, p.1). Moreover, the importance of competition as a driver of inno-
vation and growth is expected to be greater for economies that compete at or near the
leading edge of technology (Acemoglu et al. 2003, 2006; Vandenbusche et al., 2006). This
literature has led European policy-makers to base their innovation-promoting e¤orts on
the aforementioned less stringent PMR. This makes for a minimal technology and indus-
trial policy, which merely consists in lifting regulations as much as possible to ensure a
fair competition. However, putting too much emphasis on this "common wisdom" might
in the end prove ine¢cient for innovation and growth, since it leaves little scope for a
dedicated science and innovation policy (of the kind advocated by Dosi et al., 2006, for
instance).
Meanwhile, the deregulation process is going on, more markedly in some industries
than in others. In fact, since the 1980s (and mostly during the 1990s in Europe), net-
work industries such as electricity, gas, rail, airlines, post and telecommunications have
experienced an important process of market reform. The inuence of PMR in network
industries is likely to impact the technological and competitive processes of the rest of the
economy through vertical linkages, beyond what can be called the static aspects of com-
petition such as prices, tax schedules or the scope of economies of scales (Armstrong and
Sappington 2006, 2007). Thus, the transformation in the regulation of these industries
has been seen as a wider liberalisation trend in developed economies. Some applied works
(e.g. Bourlès et al., 2013) have concluded that this type of reforms has boosted produc-
tivity growth. This link is widely perceived as robust and has recently been presented as
evidence of the above-mentioned theoretical predictions. The underlying rationale is that
the lack of dynamism in key input sectors of the economy becomes an impediment for
rms to implement their innovative strategies in their own markets, especially when they
compete neck-and-neck with their rivals and seek to escape competition.
This paper critically examines the robustness of such claims, which have clear policy
implications. Indeed, they are at the root of recommandations that advocate the liber-
alisation of product markets as an innovation-boosting policy. The contribution of our
1For instance: the European Council recommendations in the context of Europe 2020 growth strategy
(O¢cial Journal of the European Union, 2011/C 217/05), OECD (2007), IMF (2010).
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critical examination is twofold. We rst start by recalling the theoretical ambiguities of
the relationship between competition and innovation. These go beyond the mechanisms
isolated in models à la Aghion et al. (2005), such as the "escape competition" e¤ect. A
review of the related empirical literature also reveals that results are fairly less clear-cut
than what the "common wisdom" presumes. We then provide a systematic empirical
assessment of the vertically-induced impact of non-manufacturing regulation (mainly in
network sectors) on innovation and productivity in the manufacturing industries. Besides
challenging the "common wisdom", this paper goes one step further in the empirical iden-
tication of the impact of regulatory reforms on technical progress. Most papers on this
topic perform estimations based on reduced-form equations with productivity (or, less
frequently, innovation) measures as the dependent variable. Here, we seek to add more
structure to the econometric model by relating PMR to innovation, and the latter to
productivity in an integrated framework.
We take inspiration from a large body of empirical work, starting from Griliches (1979,
1992, 1994, 2000) to recent studies derived from Crépon et al. (1998) who proposed a
conceptual and analytical framework relating R&D, innovation and productivity at the
rm level. Di¤ering from this literature, our empirical application is performed at the
industry level and focuses on the innovation-productivity nexus only. It relies on a sample
of 13 manufacturing industries for 17 OECD countries during the 1977-2005 period, for
which we have information on multifactor productivity, innovation, skill composition of
labour and regulatory indicators. There are several reasons for performing our test at this
level of aggregation.
First, the industry-level scope is more likely to capture information on equilibrium
relationships. Thereby, this level of analysis is more relevant to measure the bottom-line
aggregate impact on innovation and productivity of the (a priori) contradictory economic
mechanisms induced by the competitive process. Second, it also facilitates the empirical
implementation since at this level of analysis we do not face the selection issues that
plague most rm-level data on R&D. Moreover, industry-level data allows us to exploit
the variability of di¤erent PMR regimes. This helps us reduce the risk of endogeneity as
compared with observed measures of competition. Interpretations are more easily related
to policy. We consider the same PMR indicators used in the related empirical literature.
They are constructed by the OECD in order to capture the so-called "knock-on" e¤ects
of non-manufacturing regulation on the rest of the economy. In the literature, these
PMR indicators are used to measure the restrictiveness and low-competition environment
supposedly induced by PMR.
Our measure of innovative performance is patenting intensity, which is a¤ected by
PMR and in turn explains productivity. Using relative performances in total factor pro-
ductivity, we also construct a measure of the closeness to the world technology frontier
and split our sample into two unbalanced panels of national industries, depending on
whether they perform near (leaders) or far from (followers) the leading edge. This allows
us to test for a di¤erentiated impact of the regulatory environment on the technological
change of each type of industry. In this new and extended approach, using recently issued
data, results are consistent with previous ndings contradicting the idea that technical
progress at the leading edge should be grounded on liberalisation policies (e.g. Amable
et al. 2010).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the current debate and
ndings on the relationship PMC, PMR, innovation and productivity growth. Section 3
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presents the empirical strategy followed in the paper. Section 4 discusses the estimation
results. A brief conclusion on policy implications is given in Section 5
2 PMC, PMR, innovation and productivity
Key EU policy initiatives, such as the Lisbon Agenda after 2005 or Europe 2020, rely on a
couple of simple ideas. The rst is that liberalisation would open markets to competition,
allowing new entrants to bring new ideas and to challenge incumbents. The second is
that this competitive pressure would stimulate innovation because companies facing com-
petition would constantly need better products and services in order to maintain or gain
market share (Ellersgaard Nielsen et al. 2013). Explaining the contribution of competi-
tion policy to Europe 2020, Alexander Italianer, Director-General of the DG Competition
declared in 2010 that competition was the key to ensure that the vision of growth and
dynamism carried by Europe 2020 comes true: E¤ective competition pushes companies to
innovate. They have to come up with new and better products to retain existing customers
and gain new ones... Competition encourages companies to allocate their resources in
the most e¢cient way, leading companies to o¤er more choice and better quality at lower
prices. As a result competition boosts productivity, growth and job creation. 2 In order
to better understand the policy debate on these issues, as well as our own critical con-
tribution, it is worth making a selective synthesis of the main arguments analysing the
link between market structure and technological performances. We begin by focusing the
discussion on PMC as a theoretical concept and introduce PMR as the applied policy
counterpart. It should be kept in mind, however, that the link between both remains far
from trivial.3
Although the contemporary "common wisdom" states that liberalising product mar-
kets should foster innovation and productivity growth, theoretical contributions studying
the way market structure shapes the incentives to innovate do not deliver an unambigu-
ous positive relationship between PMC on the one hand and innovation or growth on
the other. The "traditional" economic view is indeed one in which PMC has a negative
impact on innovation as competition erodes innovation prots (Schumpeter 1934, 1942).
Such a negative link is featured in most endogenous growth models following the lines of
Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Aghion and
Howitt (1992).
By way of contrast, the managerial literature has provided arguments highlighting
the role of competition as a slack-reducing device (Machlup, 1967; Porter 1990). When
considering optimal (and not just satiscing) behaviour, arguments mainly rely on the idea
that PMC may reduce ine¢ciencies stemming from principal-agent governance-related
problems. However, the resulting link between PMC and rm e¢ciency is still usually
ambiguous (Scharfstein; 1988; Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003).
When innovation occurs step-by-step, that is when laggards must catch-up with the
technological leader before overtaking it, the above-mentioned Schumpeterian argument
2Competition Policy in support of the EU 2020 policy objectives. Speech at the Vienna Competition
Conference 2010 Industry vs. Competition?
3It is fair to say that the gap between de jure and de facto aspects of competition has been largely
neglected in the applied macro-level policy oriented literature on PMR and growth. See for instance
Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for a theoretical review on issues in the regulation of suppliers.
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can be used to reverse the negative relationship between PMC and innovation in some
industries. When laggards catch-up with the leader and both type of rms compete in
a neck-and-neck fashion, rms will innovate in order to escape competition. However, at
the same time, laggards innovation will be discouraged by competition as they anticipate
lower post-innovation prots. This is the underlying rationale of Aghion et al. (1997,
2005). Using this argument, the latter paper suggests that the relationship between PMC
and innovation is hump-shaped and that the peak of this curve is larger and occurs at
a higher degree of competition in more neck-and-neck industries (Aghion et al, 2005,
Proposition 5), that is to say in industries where rms compete at the same technological
level. This has given rise to the idea that the benets of increasing competition through
lowering regulation should be higher near the world technological frontier, whereas they
could be nil or even negative far from that frontier.4
The nonlinearity of the relationship between competition and innovation is more gen-
erally analysed by Boone (2001), who axiomatically denes the intensity of competition in
order to encompass di¤erent standard parametrisations. Considering heterogenous com-
petitors, Boone (2001) shows that the value of innovation changes with the identity of
the innovator, which in turn depends on the level of competition itself. No general form
of nonlinearity can be inferred without specifying the market structure in more details.
Details therefore matter and it is not surprising to nd contradicting claims when one
goes further into the industrial organisation literature. For instance, within the context
of Cournot competition with product di¤erentiation, Tishler and Milstein (2009) show
that strategic behaviour in what they call R&D wars leads to a (non-inverted) U-shaped
relationship.
As it is clear from Boone (2001), the possibility of innovation by technology leaders is
key to understanding the e¤ect of PMC. Leaders may have some advantages that allow
them to innovate despite the implied destruction of their own rents (the so-called Ar-
row e¤ect). One special form of leaders advantage is that given by its position as an
incumbent that moves rst (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982). In that case, entry becomes
endogenous and, contrary to traditional innovation-based growth models, leaders inno-
vate and may remain in the market durably. Competition for the market can then be a
substitute for competition in the market (Etro, 2007). The main idea here is that the
presence of an active monopoly can actually hide an intense competition threat. Amable
et al. (2010) show that even in a framework similar to Aghion et al. (2005), the possibility
for the technological leader to innovate in order to make the followers innovation more
di¢cult leads to a reversal of the relationship between competition and innovation in the
so-called neck-and-neck industries: competition may become detrimental to innovation,
even more so as one moves closer to the technological frontier. Moreover, the relationship
between PMR and market structure itself is also a¤ected by these strategic interactions
in a non-trivial way. Ledezma (2013) shows that, if the persistence of leadership relies
on technological advantages strategically acquired by leaders in the process of innovation,
PMR may in some cases reduce such advantages and induce rm and innovation dynam-
ics through Schumpeterian leapfrogging. PMR may in fact, purposedly or not, induce
knowledge standardisation and this can be so even if PMR is theoretically allowed to
increase the costs of innovation, as long as it forces leaders to stay, qualitatively, within
4Hölzl and Janger (2014) test the validity of the distance to the frontier argument for innovation in
Europe and show that rms close to the technological frontier increasingly rely on the creation of own
knowledge for their innovation-based growth strategies.
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the boundaries of the current good.
Implications of endogenous entry and strategic interactions render visible the weakness
of outcome measures of competition or market concentration and explain the widespread
use of regulatory indicators in the applied literature. Some contributions estimate the
impact of PMR on innovation or productivity without taking into account the proximity
to the technological frontier. Blind (2012) distinguishes several regulatory indicators
derived from business opinion surveys and tests their impact on the patenting intensity at
the macro-level for a panel of 21 countries between 1999 and 2004. His ndings display a
diversity of inuences according to the indicators. While restrictive price regulation has
a negative impact on patenting, competition legislation has no impact, and product and
service legislation, taken to deter business activity, actually has a positive inuence on a
countrys innovative performance. Barbosa and Faria (2011) focus on 10 EU countries and
22 2-digit manufacturing industries. Their cross-section estimates for the period 2002-2004
show a weakly signicant negative e¤ect of regulation on the proportion of innovative rms
within an industry. However, they use a macroeconomic indicator of PMR, common to all
industries of a given country. Empirical assessments at the industry-level using regulation
policy measures are then useful to analyse the relevance of the received argument about
the positive e¤ect of liberalisation on innovation and productivity growth.
A fairly large body of empirical literature follows this approach (see, e.g., Nicoletti
and Scarpetta, 2003; Conway et al., 2006; Bourlès et al., 2013). It usually relies on time-
varying industry-level data for developed countries. As in this paper, these works use
PMR indicators constructed by the OECD, which tabulates detailed surveys on regulatory
practices (see Section 3.1.2.). The scope of these practices is generally economy-wide or
related to the experience of PMR in network services sectors. As a way to obtain more
insights on the e¤ect of this latter type of reforms on the rest of the economy, the OECD
constructs "regulatory impact" indicators that measure the so-called "knock-on" e¤ects
of non-manufacturing regulation. This is done by connecting the regulatory practices in
key non-manufacturing input sectors to the use of these sectors output in each industry of
the economy. This is why regulatory impact indicators are usually presented as capturing
the extent to which upstream regulation restrict activities in downstream industries. The
resulting index of regulation is generally highly correlated with other aspects of PMR
measured by economy-wide indicators (Amable et al. 2010) and at the same time allows
for more time-variability across countries and industries: it is now possible to perform
estimations on PMR data presenting a panel structure where individuals are country-
industry couples (national industries), as it is the case with most of recently publicly
available measures of technological performances.
In general, estimations seek to measure the impact of PMR on economic performance
(captured by a measure of innovation or, more often, productivity) in a reduced-form
econometric equation. The latter usually includes a measure of the gap vis-à-vis the
technology frontier and a term interacting this technology gap with the PMR proxy. In
many cases, the technology gap variable is in fact a measure of closeness to the technology
frontier as the productivity of a country in a given industry and year is expressed relative
to that of the best performing country (in the same industry and year). The interaction
term indicates then how the marginal e¤ect of PMR (on economic performance) varies
with the closeness to the technology frontier. This type of specication is related to the
6
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above-discussed conclusion of Aghion et al. (2005).5
Contradicting these ndings, the results of Amable et al. (2010) show that the mar-
ginal e¤ect of PMR on patenting intensity tends to be positively growing with the close-
ness to the technological frontier. Furthermore, at the leading edge this marginal e¤ect
is signicantly positive for several specications. Although this result is not the rule in
the related empirical literature it is by no means the exception. In practical terms, it
comes from a positive estimated coe¢cient of the interaction term between PMR and
the closeness to technology frontier. The same positive sign has also been found in Nico-
letti and Scarpetta (2003) and Conway et al. (2006) with PMR indicators highlighting
economy-wide aspects of PMR and productivity growth used as a proxy for technical
progress/economic performance. Interpretations are however di¤erent: that positive sign
in an error-correction model of multifactor productivity growth is seen as a slowing down
e¤ect of PMR on the natural catching-up process of laggards. On the other hand, Bourlès
et al. (2013) do report a negative e¤ect of PMR, which grows stronger the closer to
the technology frontier. Their sample consider both manufacturing and service sectors.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Inklaar et al. (2008) highlight the specicities of both
type of sectors, something that could explain the di¤erences in estimates across studies.
Arnold et al. (2008) merge industry-level regulation data with rm-level information.
They also seek to identify a di¤erentiated e¤ect of PMR on productivity, but this time
dened on whether rms are above the productivity median at the national level. The
estimated coe¢cient of this di¤erently specied interaction term is negative.
What emerges from this snapshot of the related literature is that the relationship
between PMC, PMR, innovation and productivity growth can fairly be considered as an
open question, at least to the point of tempering the optimism of mainstream policy
recommendations. This mixture of results also appears in microeconomic country-specic
studies on PMC and innovation (e.g. Cohen et al., 2010). Case study evidence from the
electricity sector in the UK also adds to a less optimistic view as liberalisation there has
been associated with a decline in R&D e¤orts (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011). All this suggests
that the heterogeneity of national industries matters. It is then important to provide
further empirical scrutiny by fully exploiting the panel structure of the data. We show
through reduced-form estimates that the xed-e¤ect structure adopted in the econometric
model is a key issue in the specications to be estimated. Moreover, "sub-indicators" of
the regulatory impact indicator allow us to isolate the scope of government participation
in network industries, and therefore to analyse further a key element of network industries
transformation. Full privatisation was not always the strategy adopted for unbundling and
this may have had consequences for the rest of the economy. We consider then di¤erent
indicators of regulatory impact, including, excluding or isolating the scope of government
implication. Hence, relative to the existing empirical literature at the industry-level , the
paper o¤ers a more careful account of panel unobserved heterogeneity within a system
equation (the innovation-productivity nexus) in which causality is more rigorously tested
and where more economic channels can be accounted for. The detail of this analysis is
presented in what follows.
5See for instance the policy brief of Aghion (2006).
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3 Methodology
3.1 The data
3.1.1 Sources
We use three main sources of industry-level time-series data. From the EU KLEMS
database constructed by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC), we
draw information on labour inputs and multifactor productivity (MFP) measures. This
information has been completed with data on patenting from EUROSTAT and with PMR
indicators constructed by the OECD.We focus on manufacturing activities for which there
exists available information on the main variables in our specications. This leads to an
unbalanced panel of 17 countries, 13 industries spanning from 1977-2005, which leads to
more than ve thousand potentially exploitable observations. Sample details are given
in Appendix. Tables A1 and A2 present the lists of countries and industries. Aggregate
descriptive statistics (mean, dispersion and number of non-missing observations) at the
country level are reported in Table A3.
3.1.2 Main variables
MFP growth, MFP levels and closeness to the world technology frontier We
rely on measures of MFP growth relative to the base year 1995, available in the EU
KLEMS database (March 2011 update of the November 2009 release). The use of EU
KLEMS data on MFP growth is preferred to own custom calculations for several reasons.
Methods and data are publicly available and continuously updated so that our analysis
share a common accessible basis with other related studies. National Accounts are system-
atically considered in EU KLEMS and completed with cross-checked micro level surveys,
which increases information availability. At the same time the underlying methodology
ensures conceptual consistency between variables and di¤erent scopes of aggregation. Im-
proved availability is also gained in terms of detailed series on capital and labour inputs,
which allows for a more precise growth accounting. Details on these and other features
of the EU KLEMS database can be found in OMahony and Timmer (2009).6
Our empirical strategy also requires MFP levels in order to construct an indicator of
the closeness to the world technology frontier (WTF) which shall be used in our regres-
sions to split the sample into "leader" and "follower" national industries. MFP levels were
obtained combining (i) the MFP growth measures of EU KLEMS and (ii) the Productiv-
ity Levels (PL) database, also provided by the GGDC.7 The latter contains MFP indexes
in levels relative to the United States only for the year 1997. This constraint is imposed
by the need of o¤ering information comparable over time and across countries and in-
dustries. To this aim, a specic deation procedure is performed, which imposes heavy
data requirements for constructing purchasing power parities (PPP) at the industry level.
For this reason the PL database proposes measures in levels only for the benchmark year
1997, which is the best documented period for such a purpose. In addition, the resulting
information on MFP levels also o¤ers a double deation scheme for value added.
6For the data and further documentation see http://www.euklems.net/index.html and the numerous
EU KLEMS publications dealing with particular applications as well methodological issues. OMahony
and Timmer (2009) also present statistical comparisons with the OECD STAN database.
7http://www.rug.nl/feb/Onderzoek/Onderzoekscentra/GGDC/data/levels
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Using both the EUKLEMS and PL databases it is possible, however, to reproduce
MFP series in levels for the full sample period. This amounts to apply the so called
constant-PPP approach (see Inklaar and Timmer, 2008). More precisely, for a given
country c, industry i and time period t let MFPGbc;i;t be the MFP growth index relative
to the year base b; MFPcit the MFP level index and MFPUScit that relative to the United
States. In this notation, what the EU KLEMS and PL databases provide are, respectively
MFPG95cit =
MFPcit
MFPci95
MFPUSci97 =
MFPci97
MFPUSi97
MFP measures in levels for the full sample span are then obtained (after adjustment of
the year base of the MFP growth index to 1997) as:
MFPUScit =MFP
US
ci97
MFPG97cit
MFPG97USit
=
MFPcit
MFPUSit
(1)
With MFP levels at hand we dene our measure of closeness to the WTF as follows. For
a given industry and time period we rst identify the WTF as the highest MFP level
observed in the sample, i.e. that of the leader country in the industry for the year of
observation. Formally,
WTFit =MFP
US
cit where c
 = argmax
c

MFPUScit
	
(2)
For each country c in a given industry i and time period t; the closeness to the WTF,
CLcit, is then dened as its MFP level relative to that of the WTF:
CLcit =
MFPUScit
WTFit
=
MFPcit
MFPcit
(3)
As the last equality makes clear, the MFP level of the United States does not participate
in the denition of CLcit.
In our regressions, MFPG95cit is used as the dependent variable and WTFit belongs to
the set of explanatory variables. The constructed indicator of CLcit does not make part
of the set of covariates in the regressions. It is only used to identify subsamples of leaders
and followers national industries.
Innovation Innovation is measured as patent intensity (PI), that is to say the num-
ber of patents divided by hours worked. Patent statistics relates to patent applications
to the European Patent O¢ce (EPO) by sector of economic activity (EUROSTAT, Sci-
ences & Technology database). Thanks to a concordance matrix between international
patent classication (IPC) and NACE classication of economic activity (Rev 1.1), the
statistics of patent applications can be distributed across industries for a given country
(See Schmoch et al. 2003). Because of this distribution and the size-normalisation (with
hours worked) we have a variable that is no longer an integer but a continuous aggregate
indicator of innovation intensity.
Skill composition of labour Although the March 2011 update of the 2009 EUKLEMS
release provides information on labour inputs and labour compensation, the details on skill
composition is only available in the previous release (2008). We extract from this latter
9
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source the share of hours worked by high-skilled persons in order to include it in our
regressions as a potential determinant of innovation. As a result, the main estimations
do not consider the years 2006 and 2007 for which we have no information on skill com-
position. On the other hand, reduced form estimates shown in the preliminary analysis
performed in Section 3.1 do exploit the full length of the sample for the main variables
and deliver consistent conclusions.
Product market regulation PMR is measured through the regulation impact (hence-
forth REGIMP) indicator constructed by the OECD. We use the 2008 updated release
(see Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for the methodology details).8 REGIMP measures the
knock-on e¤ect of regulation in key non-manufacturing (NM) input sectors on the rest
of the economy. These input sectors include: (i) network services such as energy (elec-
tricity and gas), transport (air, rail and road transport) and communications (post and
telecommunications) - the regulation of which is captured by the ETCR indicator; (ii)
retail distribution and professional services - the regulation of which is captured by the
RBSR regulation; and (iii) nance. Regulation in each of these activities is measured
as an average composite of scores constructed upon qualitative information about regu-
latory practices in several important "regulatory areas". For ETCR, these areas cover
entry, public ownership, vertical integration, price controls and market structure. Infor-
mation here is available for the 1975-2007 period. For RBSR regulation, areas consider
more specic restrictions on entry and conduct, and the data contains information for
1998, 2003 and 2008. Information on the nancial sector has the lowest coverage (only
for 2003). Scores in all indicators of NM regulation are coded accordingly to an increasing
schedule (from 0 to 6) reecting the restrictiveness imposed by regulatory provisions.
REGIMP seeks to capture the impact of these NM regulatory provisions on all eco-
nomic sectors. For each 2-digit ISIC industry, REGIMP is computed as a weighted sum
of NM regulation indicators, where weights reect the use of the respective NM sector
as input.9 The requirements of NM sectors in each industry are in turn obtained from
harmonised input/output matrices. PMR in a NM sector will have a stronger impact on a
specic industry if it is heavily used in production. Given this vertical linkage, REGIMP
is usually interpreted as associating regulation in "upstream" industries with operation
"downstream", although it should be kept in mind that not all manufacturing industries
are nal goods and that not all NM sector output is used in production activities. That
said, an important share of NM sector output is used for production in other sectors.
Conway and Nicoletti (2006), based on the input/output tables, report shares ranging
from 50 to 80% so that REGIMP does give a measure about the degree of restrictiveness
imposed to manufacturing activities due to PMR in key sectors of the economy.
As previously mentioned, a key advantage of REGIMP is its panel variability, which is
compatible with our set of variables. At the same time, it remains strongly correlated with
other measures capturing more directly regulatory practices, but that have the drawback
of being economy-wide indicators with scarce variability in both time and cross-section
dimensions (see for instance PMR indicators used in Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). The
latest release of REGIMP data also o¤ers series restricted to the regulatory area of pub-
8www.oecd.org/economy/pmr.
9NM regulation indicators must be mapped to a 2-digit ISIC classication which implies in some cases
a simple average of sub-indicators of regulation (e.g. the average of regulation in Post and regulation in
Telecomunication for the ISIC sector 64 Post and telecomunication).
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lic ownership (henceforth the RPO indicator) as well as series excluding this dimension
(henceforth RWPO). We use these additional series as alternative PMR indicators in our
robustness checks.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
We estimate a two-equation model that allows us to identify (i) the determinants of
innovation and (ii) those of MFP (which include innovation itself). Among these de-
terminants, the vertically-induced e¤ects of non-manufacturing PMR (henceforth PMR
for brevity) is expected to play a crucial role, which may depend on whether national
industries compete far from or close to the WTF. In the rst-stage equation, patent in-
tensity of country c; in industry i at time period t   1; lnPIcit 1; is explained by its
own autoregressive process, the level of PMR, lnPMRcit 1, the share of hours worked by
high-skilled workers, lnHScit 1; and the MFP level exhibited by the WTF, lnWTFit 1.
In the second-stage equation, the dependent variable is the log-di¤erence of MFP relative
to the base year 1995, viz. lnMFPG95cit = lnMFPcit  lnMFPci95, which is explained by
PMR, patent intensity and the MFP level of the WTF. Neither the autoregressive process
of innovation nor the share of high-skilled labour are assumed to directly inuence the
log-di¤erence of MFP (recall that the productivity accounting allowing to compute MFP
as a residual has already taken into account input factors). Formally,
lnMFPG95cit = 0 + 1 lnPMRcit 1 + 2 lnPIcit 1 + 3 lnWTFit 1 + ci + t + "cit (4)
lnPIcit 1 = 0 + 1 lnPMRcit 1 + 2 lnWTFit 1 + 3 lnHScit 1 +
Pm
=k  lnPIcit 1 
+ci + t 1 + cit 1
where ci; ci are individual (country-industry) unobserved xed e¤ects; t and t are time
specic unobserved xed e¤ects; and nally "cit and cit the idiosyncratic disturbances.
In our regressions we consider alternatively  = 3; 4 and 5. We use an instrument
variable (IV) and GMM approaches to estimate (4). In both cases we take into account the
unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity by exploiting within-group variance.
This implies that the productivity equation will in fact be estimated in levels (i.e. the
term lnMFPci95 lnMFPG95cit = ln
MFPcit
MFPci95
at the left-hand side will be eliminated by
the within-group transformation). In estimating (4) we also consider the possibility of
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
In order to identify a di¤erentiated e¤ect of PMR accordingly to the "neck-and-
neckness" of the technological competition, our estimations consider two kind of sub-
samples: leaders and followers. Leaders are dened as those country-industry couples
performing above a certain percentile of the sample distribution of the closeness to the
world technology frontier, CLcit, dened by eq. (3). We consider in our regressions the
50th, the 60th and the 75th percentiles of the CLcit as alternative cuto¤ levels for the
sample splitting. In each case, we allow our parameter estimates to di¤er in each sub-
sample. The MFP level featured at WTF, lnWTFit 1; is introduced as an explanatory
variable in both equations in order to control for technological externatilities.
By letting PMR participate in both equations, we can identify how PMR a¤ects MFP
through patented innovation as well as through other type of non-patented innovative
activity. With the sample splitting we can test how its inuence may vary according to
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the technology lead of a country in a given industry and time period. The most received
argument discussed above suggests that one should expect in the rst stage equation
1 < 0 for leaders and 1 > 0 for followers, provided that 2 > 0:
4 Results
4.1 Preliminary analysis
The three-dimensional structure of our data implies the presence of di¤erent sources
of unobserved specicities explaining MFP di¤erences across national industries. We
start therefore our analysis by estimating reduced-form regressions which seek to explain
the log di¤erence of MFP by the log of our indicator of PMR (REGIMP) and a set of
dummies controlling for time, country and industry xed e¤ects, as well as their plausible
interactions. Formally, we test:
lnMFPG95cit = 0 + 1 lnPMRcit 1 + cit (5)
where cit is composed of an intrinsical disturbance cit and several xed e¤ects, the
specic form of which depends on the hypotheses regarding the underlying unobserved
heterogeneity. Results are presented in Table 1. In column (1) the specication considers
country, industry and time xed e¤ects, i.e. cit = c + i + t + ict and yields a
signicantly negative elasticity of REGIMP. This result still holds and with increased
magnitude (in absolute value) when the specication includes country-specic time xed
e¤ects, i.e. cit = c+i+t+ct+ ict; which seeks to control for national-level shocks.
This type of dummy structure, controlling for national trends, is close to that assumed
by Bourlès et al. (2013).
Column (3) and (4) report on specications considering this time individual (country-
specic industry) xed-e¤ects. Regression in column (3) includes also time xed e¤ects,
i.e. cit = ci + t + ict , whereas country-specic time xed e¤ects are added in the re-
gression reported in column (4), i.e. cit = ci+ct+t+ict . Both of these specications
are estimated using the within-group transformation. The Fisher test here indicates that
we can reject at any conventional risk the null of no-joint e¤ect of individual (country-
industry) intrinsic characteristics. In both of these regressions the elasticity of REGIMP
is signicantly positive. This elasticity increases after the inclusion of country-time dum-
mies, as in column (2). Hence, controlling for unobserved time-invariant individual het-
erogeneity matters. Unobserved determinants of MFP tied to national industry-level
specicities and correlated with our regulation proxy (e.g. institutions, initial conditions,
technology-based R&D propensity, etc.) may lead to biased estimations if only indus-
try characteristics common to all countries and/or country characteristics common to all
industries are controlled for.
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Table 1. Reduced-form regressions
Dependent variable : MFP growth relative to 1995, lnMFPG95cit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(REGIMPcit) -0.084*** -0.199*** 0.701*** 2.144***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.058) (0.149)
Cons 4.040*** 3.619*** 5.714*** 8.917***
(0.092) (0.181) (0.131) (0.351)
Fixed-e¤ects c; i; t c; i; ct; t ci;t ci; ct; t
Number of Obs. 5622 5622 5622 5622
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.24
Individuals 220 220
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. c; i; t; ci
and ct stand for, resp., country, industry, time, country-specic industry and
country-specic time xed e¤ects.
4.2 Two-step estimates
The results of the two-step analysis are presented in Tables 2 to 7. These tables report the
estimation of eq. (4) for a subsample of leaders or followers national industries, dened
di¤erently depending on whether they are respectively above or below the 50th, the 60th
or the 75th percentile of our measure of closeness to the WTF (see section 2). All Tables
show for a given type of individual (leader or follower) and regulation indicator (REGIMP,
RWPO or RPO) the rst-stage estimates (the patenting equation) in the upper panel and
the second stage (the MFP equation) in the bottom panel. Columns (1) to (3) present
estimations of the same model for a sample split at the 50th, 60th and 75th percentile
respectively. Here, the lag of patenting intensity is instrumented by its own third lag.
Columns (4) to (6) consider an additional scrutiny for the regressions of column (3),
which is performed using the strictest denition of closennes to WTF. In this denition
leaders are the national industries above the 75th percentile of WTF and followers those
below, a sample split particularly interesting as it captures di¤erentiated e¤ects of PMR on
what can be called the leading-edge of technology. These alternative regressions consider
deeper autoregressive processes for patenting intensity. All models consider individual (i.e.
country-industry) and time xed e¤ects. In all regressions also, statistics are robust to
arbitrary heteroskedasticity as well as to arbitrary autocorrelation through kernel-based
estimations. Column (6) reports the results obtained from estimations implementing
two-step e¢cient generalised method of moments (GMM).
The rows at the end of each table give a summary of tests on instruments as well as
on identication. These consist of (i) the Hansen test on the vailidity of overidentify-
ing restrictions, (ii) a rank test for underidentication based on a Lagrangean multiplier
version of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic, which amounts to generalise the
Anderson canonical correlation rank statistic to the non-i.i.d. case; (iii) a weak identi-
cation test which is a "robust" analog of the weak identication IV test for the i.i.d.
case (Stock and Yogo, 2005), based on the Kleibergen-paap rk statistics; and nally (iv)
a weak-identication-robust inference test (i.e. a test on the structural signicance of
the endogenous regressors) based on Anderson and Rubin (1949), here also considering
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heteroskedasticity-robust statistics.10 Athough changing the regulation proxy or the sam-
ple of national industries amounts to changing the scope of the regulatory provisions being
considered and their expected impact on innovation and productivity, we keep the same
specication of instruments for the sake of comparison. The same structure of presentation
is then kept in all tables.
The rst estimations are made with the REGIMP indicator and the results are doc-
umented in Table 2 for the leaders and Table 3 for the followers. The impact of PMR,
measured by this proxy, is generally positive for leaders at both the innovation and the
productivity stage. Interestingly, the point elasticity of PMR at the rst stage (innova-
tion) is positive but the parameter estimated is not signicantly di¤erent from zero at
conventional levels in broad denitions of leader (i.e. national industries above the 50th
and the 60th percentile of closeness to the WTF). However, this positive impact becomes
signicant and signicantly higher when one narrows the denition of the leaders or, to
put it di¤erently, when one goes nearer to the technology frontier: the elasticity jumps
from 0.080 at the 50% split to 0.486 at the 75% level. Even in the fully instrumented
model (columns (5) and (6)) the estimated elasticity is more than four times higher at the
75th percentile split. The instrumentation strategy is also validated for the 60% and the
75% threshold.11 Therefore, contrary to the common wisdom, these estimations show that
PMR has a positive impact on innovation, which grows with the proximity to the WTF.
As expected, skilled labour also favourably inuences innovation, which is also positively
a¤ected by past innovation performance. On the other hand, spillovers stemming from
the WTF appear to not signicantly a¤ect innovation for leader national industries. At
the second stage (productivity), innovation is seen to positively inuence productivity in
all regressions, with an elasticity that does not vary signicantly with the denition of the
leader/follower split in the basic regressions. The positive impact of patents on productiv-
ity should dispel any doubts one might have had about the relevance of that variable for
representing signicant innovations. The introduction of the productivity externality term
appear with a signicantly positive coe¢cient, but only at the vicinity of the WTF. For
this subsample the value of the innovation elasticity is higher. The productivity equation
also shows that PMR positively impacts productivity by other channels than innovative
patented activity. Although in this stage the associated elasticity of PMR is signicantly
positive and sizeable everywhere, it is also larger at the leading edge.
The results for the followers are documented in Table 3. The elasticity of PMR at
the innovation stage is signicantly negative for every sample split, and less negative at
the 75% cuto¤ level than at the 50% or the 60% cuto¤ levels. Combining this with the
results obtained for the leaders, one obtains a signicantly negative inuence of PMR
far from the technology frontier that gradually turns into a signicantly positive impact
that grows when one gets near the technology frontier. This is exactly the opposite of
the relationship postulated by the "common wisdom". Our results are nevertheless in
accordance with those of Amable et al. (2010), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Con-
10Whereas for the Hansen test we would like to fail to reject the null hypothesis that orthogonality
conditions are valid, for the rest of tests the rejection of the respective null hypothesis is evidence of
proper specication.
11The higher p-values, yet still small, for the Anderson-Rubin tests are the consequence of the joint
hypothesis tested: the coe¢cient of the endogenous regressor in the structural equation is equal to zero,
and, in addition, the overidentifying restrictions are valid. As can be seen in Table 2, the coe¢cients of
the lagged patenting intensity is itself signicant at least at the 10% level.
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way et al. (2006).12 The fact that these results di¤er from what is generally seen as
"common wisdom" illustrates how the relationship between PMR, innovation and growth
is far from unambiguous. Depending on the proxies and econometric methodologies used,
there is scope for some variety in the results. For instance, most empirical studies in the
literature fail to develop suitable controls for unobserved individual heterogeneity, het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the models from which they derive their results. In
the present study, we not only use a carefully-constructed measure of MFP, we also im-
plement an econometric methodology that controls for the above-mentioned biases (which
may typically plague large panels in which the time dimension is long).
Going back to our other results, we nd that the other elasticities in the innovation
equation are in conformity with expectations: a signicantly positive inuence of skilled
labour and past innovation. The world productivity frontier here again does not exert
a signicant impact. At the second stage, as expected, the inuence of innovation on
productivity is not as high as with industry leaders. The estimate of the elasticity of
productivity with respect to innovation is only signicant at 10% for the 50% and 60%
cuto¤ levels (columns (1) and (2)) and, when signicant, less than a half of the innovation
elasticity for leaders in comparable models. Interestingly also, ccontrary to what happens
in the innovation stage, in the productivity equation PMR has a signicantly positive
impact on the productivity of followers, and the elasticity is generally higher than that
estimated for leaders. This suggests the presence of important non-patented innovative
activity in this sub-sample.
12As we mentioned, interpretations may be radically di¤erent.
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Table 2.
Leaders - Innovation equation (rst-stage estimates)- REGIMP indicator
Dependent variable: patenting intensity, ln(PIcit 1)
WTF split Q50 Q60 Q75 Q75 Q75 Q75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(REGIMPcit 1) 0.080 0.100 0.486*** 0.406*** 0.331** 0.331**
(0.101) (0.127) (0.152) (0.145) (0.143) (0.143)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.030 -0.015 -0.022 -0.039 -0.033 -0.033
(0.030) (0.039) (0.053) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045)
ln(PIcit 4) 0.491*** 0.459*** 0.393*** 0.339*** 0.299*** 0.299***
(0.023) (0.028) (0.034) (0.050) (0.057) (0.057)
ln(PIcit 5) 0.135*** 0.186*** 0.186***
(0.047) (0.063) (0.063)
ln(PIcit 6) 0.064 0.064
(0.040) (0.040)
ln(HScit 1) 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.108** 0.135*** 0.147*** 0.147***
(0.039) (0.043) (0.048) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Leaders - Productivity equation (second-stage estimates)- REGIMP indicator
Dependent variable: MFP growth relative to 1995, lnMFPG95cit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(PIcit 1) 0.120*** 0.109** 0.135* 0.199** 0.221*** 0.171**
(0.040) (0.045) (0.071) (0.078) (0.081) (0.075)
ln(REGIMPcit 1) 0.341*** 0.546*** 0.453*** 0.436*** 0.441*** 0.480***
(0.108) (0.126) (0.156) (0.157) (0.159) (0.157)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.062 0.008 0.117** 0.113** 0.105* 0.117**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
Number of obs. 2528 2018 1262 1216 1169 1169
Individuals 150 130 87 85 84 84
Tests of instruments and identication
Overidentifying restrictions (Hansen test)
p-value (J statistic) 0.004 0.108 0.484 0.595 0.211 0.211
Under identication (Kleibergen-Paap rank test )
p-value (LM statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identication (Kleibergen-Paap based, for non-i.i.d errors)
Wald F statistic 233.18 140.327 71.818 62.053 54.231 54.231
Endogenous regressors (Anderson-Rubin test)
p-value (chi-2 test) 0.001 0.034 0.173 0.086 0.028 0.028
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See eq. (4)
for details on the IV specication. All estimations consider a constant term, individual
(country-industry) xed e¤ects and year dummies. Statistics are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and also to arbitrary autocorrelation through kernel-based estimations.
Column (6) reports two-step e¢cient generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations.
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Table 3.
Followers - Innovation equation (rst-stage estimates)- REGIMP indicator
Dependent variable: patenting intensity, ln(PIcit 1)
WTF split Q50 Q60 Q75 Q75 Q75 Q75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(REGIMPcit 1) -0.353*** -0.368*** -0.254*** -0.240*** -0.250*** -0.250***
(0.096) (0.087) (0.076) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.021 -0.020 0.001 -0.007 -0.020 -0.020
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
ln(PIcit 4) 0.436*** 0.449*** 0.481*** 0.423*** 0.370*** 0.370***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034)
ln(PIcit 5) 0.150*** 0.130*** 0.130***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.034)
ln(PIcit 6) 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.026) (0.026)
ln(HScit 1) 0.030 0.038 0.089** 0.096*** 0.079** 0.079**
(0.048) (0.039) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84
Followers - Productivity equation (second-stage estimates) - REGIMP indicator
Dependent variable: MFP growth relative to 1995, lnMFPG95cit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(PIcit 1) 0.058 0.054 0.069** 0.083** 0.093** 0.093***
(0.050) (0.043) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034)
ln(REGIMPcit 1) 0.676*** 0.673*** 0.577*** 0.591*** 0.604*** 0.508***
(0.223) (0.185) (0.148) (0.150) (0.152) (0.130)
ln(WTFcit 1) 0.107*** 0.071** 0.025 0.013 0.010 -0.003
(0.038) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
Number of obs. 2328 2843 3603 3478 3356 3356
Individuals 162 182 197 197 196 196
Tests of instruments and identication
Overidentifying restrictions (Hansen test)
p-value (J statistic) 0.015 0.056 0.130 0.161 0.123 0.123
Under identication (Kleibergen-Paap rank test )
p-value (LM statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identication (Kleibergen-Paap based, for non-i.i.d errors)
Wald F statistic 117.62 157.084 252.284 249.726 190.421 190.421
Endogenous regressors (Anderson-Rubin test)
p-value (chi-2 test) 0.026 0.077 0.044 0.012 0.010 0.010
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See eq. (4)
for details on the IV specication. All estimations consider a constant term, individual
(country-industry) xed e¤ects and year dummies. Statistics are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and also to arbitrary autocorrelation through kernel-based estimations.
Column (6) reports two-step e¢cient generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations.
To sum up, with the widely-used REGIMP indicator, PMR has been found to be
a positive inuence on leaders innovation and a negative one on followers. This is
the opposite of the received view about the merits of deregulation policy for innovation
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performance at the leading edge, but this is in accord with previous results discussed
above (specially those by Amable et al. (2010)) and also with standard Schumpeterian
mechanisms. Moreover, PMR has also a positive inuence on productivity and this time
for both leaders and followers, which again contradicts the "common wisdom".
As explained in Section 2, the regulation proxy REGIMP is an aggregate index that
summarises all areas of regulation covered in each sub-index of regulatory practices in
network services, retail and nance. In order to disentangle di¤erent channels by which
product market provisions in these sectors a¤ect the rest of the economy, the OECD
provides alternative indicators that either exclude the public ownership dimension (the
aforementioned RWPO indicator), or isolate it (the aforementioned RPO indicator). We
use these as alternative measures of regulatory pressures shaping the innovative activity
of national industries.
Tables 4 and 5 present estimations performed with the RWPO indicator of regulation,
respectively for leaders and followers. Regressions using this alternative indicator are
interesting in that they help to identify whether the positive impact of PMR on innova-
tion and productivity presented above relates to provisions shaping market structure (and
thus the incentives to engage in innovative activities), or conversely to the presence of the
State, which may have a particularly higher propention to engage in R&D investments
(motivated for instance by wider public policies integrating the positive externalities of
the innovation process). Measured by this indicator, PMR appears to impact innova-
tion in a broadly similar fashion to that observed above using the REGIMP indicator.
The signicantly positive inuence of RWPO on leaders innovation also appears in the
vicinity of the WTF. The impact of RWPO on followers is mainly negative but less so
as one moves closer to the leading edge. Therefore, the slope of the curve linking the
PMR-elasticity of innovation to the proximity to the technological frontier is here again
positive, and not negative as the common wisdom would have it. Regarding the other
regressors of the rst stage, we observe that the impact of the share of skilled labour is also
similar to those obtained previously: positive for leaders innovation and lower and less
signicant for followers innovation. Likewise, in this stage, spillovers stemming from the
world technology leader are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. As for the productivity
equation, innovation has a signicantly positive inuence on leaders productivity, and
this time a non-signicant one for followers, which is consistent with the large p-values in
the corresponding Anderson-Rubin tests. Using the RWPO indicator, PMR has almost
no direct impact on followers or on leaders productivity. The world technological frontier
externality has a positive impact on leaders especially when the closeness to the WTF is
restricted to the 75%. Estimations using the RWPO indicator yield then a similar pattern
regarding the innovation stage but a fairly weaker one regarding the productivity stage.
Instrumentation is validated in terms of orthogonality and identication for leading edge
estimates.
Estimations are then performed with RPO which considers only the public ownership
dimension. The results are featured in Tables 6 and 7 for leaders and followers respectively.
As it was the case with the other PMR indicators, the impact of RPO on innovation
is signicantly positive and increases with the proximity to the technological frontier.
PMR presents here also a signicantly negative inuence on innovation with followers.
Innovation for leaders also presents a sizeable positive and signicant impact, although it
should be kept in mind that the same instrumenting strategy used in the previous tests
in the productivity equation of leaders is not validated here by the test of exogeneity of
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the instruments. The results of the innovation equation as a single equation, and namely
the sign of the elasticities of the PMR indicator, of course are not concerned by this. For
the productivity equation of followers when the sample is split at the 75th percentile, the
exogeneity of instruments is broadly validated, especially in the full specication. Here
again, as in the case of REGIMP, PMR appears to positively inuence productivity for
followers, even though is negatively associated with their patenting intensity. Overal, even
if weaker in light of orthogonality conditions in the two-equation model for leaders, the
evidence suggested by the RPO indicator by no means gives support to the postulate of a
negative inuence of larger upstream public ownership on leading-edge technical progress.
Indeed, the opposite can be concluded from the single innovation equation.
Therefore, the estimations made with the other indicators of vertically-induced PMR
broadly conrm the results obtained with REGIMP. Regulation has a positive inuence
on innovation at the leading edge and, in several cases, directly on productivity as well.
Besides, the relationship between the impact of PMR and the distance to the technological
frontier that one can draw from the previous results contradicts the received view: PMRs
benecial e¤ects are stronger for industries that are closer to the frontier.
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Table 4.
Leaders - Innovation equation (rst-stage estimates)- RWPO indicator
Dependent variable: patenting intensity, ln(PIcit 1)
WTF split Q50 Q60 Q75 Q75 Q75 Q75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(RWPOcit 1) 0.076 0.074 0.329*** 0.342*** 0.368*** 0.368***
(0.081) (0.100) (0.121) (0.115) (0.113) (0.113)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.039 -0.032 -0.032 -0.049 -0.045 -0.045
(0.030) (0.039) (0.055) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046)
ln(PIcit 4) 0.493*** 0.463*** 0.409*** 0.354*** 0.308*** 0.308***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.036) (0.055) (0.064) (0.064)
ln(PIcit 5) 0.136*** 0.189*** 0.189***
(0.050) (0.067) (0.067)
ln(PIcit 6) 0.073* 0.073*
(0.042) (0.042)
ln(HScit 1) 0.076** 0.087** 0.085* 0.116*** 0.139*** 0.139***
(0.037) (0.043) (0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
Leaders - Productivity equation (second-stage estimates)- RWPO indicator
Dependent variable: MFP growth relative to 1995, lnMFPG95cit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(PIcit 1) 0.121*** 0.124** 0.182** 0.254*** 0.273*** 0.238***
(0.042) (0.048) (0.073) (0.079) (0.083) (0.079)
ln(RWPOcit 1) 0.022 0.187* 0.158 0.145 0.144 0.151
(0.092) (0.110) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135) (0.132)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.069* -0.004 0.109** 0.106** 0.098* 0.109**
(0.042) (0.044) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053)
Number of obs. 2398 1917 1196 1154 1112 1112
Individuals 146 126 82 80 79 79
Tests of instruments and identication
Overidentifying restrictions (Hansen test)
p-value (J statistic) 0.025 0.205 0.679 0.742 0.220 0.220
Under identication (Kleibergen-Paap rank test )
p-value (LM statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identication (Kleibergen-Paap based, for non-i.i.d errors)
Wald F statistic 204.263 124.064 68.257 57.501 52.506 52.506
Endogenous regressors (Anderson-Rubin test)
p-value (chi-2 test) 0.002 0.023 0.042 0.013 0.003 0.003
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See eq. (4)
for details on the IV specication. All estimations consider individual (country-industry)
xed e¤ects and year dummies. Statistics are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and
also to arbitrary autocorrelation through kernel-based estimations. Column (6) reports
two-step e¢cient generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations.
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Table 5.
Followers - Innovation equation (rst-stage estimates)- RWPO indicator
Dependent variable: patenting intensity, ln(PIcit 1)
WTF split Q50 Q60 Q75 Q75 Q75 Q75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(RWPOcit 1) -0.222** -0.236*** -0.167** -0.111* -0.093 -0.093
(0.088) (0.080) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.010 -0.016 0.001 -0.005 -0.016 -0.016
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
ln(PIcit 4) 0.432*** 0.446*** 0.473*** 0.416*** 0.358*** 0.358***
(0.030) (0.026) (0.022) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
ln(PIcit 5) 0.155*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.028) (0.035) (0.035)
ln(PIcit 6) 0.113*** 0.113***
(0.026) (0.026)
ln(HScit 1) 0.037 0.039 0.069* 0.080** 0.058* 0.058*
(0.050) (0.043) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.83
Followers - Productivity equation (second-stage estimates)- RWPO indicator
Dependent variable: MFP growth relative to 1995, lnMFPG95cit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(PIcit 1) -0.008 -0.012 0.008 0.021 0.035 0.050
(0.048) (0.041) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034)
ln(RWPOcit 1) 0.030 0.060 0.038 0.053 0.070 0.090
(0.100) (0.085) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069)
ln(WTFcit 1) 0.090** 0.059* 0.016 0.005 0.000 -0.006
(0.037) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Number of obs. 2263 2749 3474 3358 3244 3244
Individuals 162 181 197 197 196 196
Tests of instruments and identication
Overidentifying restrictions (Hansen test)
p-value (J statistic) 0.295 0.318 0.500 0.106 0.080 0.080
Under identication (Kleibergen-Paap rank test )
p-value (LM statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identication (Kleibergen-Paap based, for non-i.i.d errors)
Wald F statistic 108.934 143.801 223.719 219.13 172.072 172.072
Endogenous regressors (Anderson-Rubin test)
p-value (chi-2 test) 0.571 0.595 0.744 0.103 0.067 0.067
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See eq. (4)
for details on the IV specication. All estimations consider a constant term, individual
(country-industry) xed e¤ects and year dummies. Statistics are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and also to arbitrary autocorrelation through kernel-based estimations.
Column (6) reports two-step e¢cient generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations.
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Table 6.
Leaders - Innovation equation (rst-stage estimates)- RPO indicator
Dependent variable: patenting intensity, ln(PIcit 1)
WTF split Q50 Q60 Q75 Q75 Q75 Q75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(RPOcit 1) 0.153* 0.176* 0.489*** 0.342*** 0.212** 0.212**
(0.080) (0.104) (0.106) (0.103) (0.107) (0.107)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.022 0.001 -0.028 -0.037 -0.028 -0.028
(0.030) (0.039) (0.054) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
ln(PIcit 4) 0.512*** 0.478*** 0.412*** 0.311*** 0.273*** 0.273***
(0.024) (0.030) (0.036) (0.055) (0.063) (0.063)
ln(PIcit 5) 0.178*** 0.189** 0.189**
(0.050) (0.075) (0.075)
ln(PIcit 6) 0.087** 0.087**
(0.044) (0.044)
ln(HScit 1) 0.130*** 0.123*** 0.102** 0.112** 0.104** 0.104**
(0.040) (0.044) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.81
Leaders - Productivity equation (second-stage estimates)- RPO indicator
Dependent variable: MFP growth relative to 1995, lnMFPG95cit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(PIcit 1) 0.115*** 0.100** 0.172** 0.230** 0.259** 0.183*
(0.043) (0.049) (0.082) (0.094) (0.103) (0.101)
ln(RPOcit 1) 0.243*** 0.356*** 0.162 0.144 0.145 0.177
(0.075) (0.085) (0.115) (0.121) (0.125) (0.120)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.073 0.001 0.118* 0.115* 0.110* 0.114*
(0.046) (0.049) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Number of obs. 2277 1795 1075 1037 999 999
Individuals 145 124 83 81 80 80
Tests of instruments and identication
Overidentifying restrictions (Hansen test)
p-value (J statistic) 0.000 0.004 0.015 0.029 0.009 0.009
Under identication (Kleibergen-Paap rank test )
p-value (LM statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identication (Kleibergen-Paap based, for non-i.i.d errors)
Wald F statistic 237.382 134.879 67.345 50.004 36.444 36.444
Endogenous regressors (Anderson-Rubin test)
p-value (chi-2 test) 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See eq. (4)
for details on the IV specication. All estimations consider a constant term, individual
(country-industry) xed e¤ects and year dummies. Statistics are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and also to arbitrary autocorrelation through kernel-based estimations.
Column (6) reports two-step e¢cient generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations.
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Table 7.
Followers - Innovation equation (rst-stage estimates)- RPO indicator
Dependent variable: patenting intensity, ln(PIcit 1)
WTF split Q50 Q60 Q75 Q75 Q75 Q75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(RPOcit 1) -0.192** -0.169** -0.072 -0.100 -0.131** -0.131**
(0.095) (0.083) (0.069) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062)
ln(WTFcit 1) -0.028 -0.024 -0.002 -0.011 -0.025 -0.025
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
ln(PIcit 4) 0.454*** 0.468*** 0.494*** 0.426*** 0.376*** 0.376***
(0.030) (0.026) (0.022) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036)
ln(PIcit 5) 0.160*** 0.157*** 0.157***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.037)
ln(PIcit 6) 0.078*** 0.078***
(0.025) (0.025)
ln(HScit 1) 0.044 0.051 0.096** 0.098*** 0.071** 0.071**
(0.050) (0.041) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Followers - Productivity equation (second-stage estimates)- RPO indicator
Dependent variable: MFP growth relative to 1995, lnMFPG95cit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(PIcit 1) 0.023 0.016 0.042 0.056 0.067* 0.074**
(0.049) (0.042) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
ln(RPOcit 1) 0.605*** 0.558*** 0.458*** 0.490*** 0.521*** 0.445***
(0.177) (0.145) (0.113) (0.116) (0.120) (0.106)
ln(WTFcit 1) 0.105*** 0.069** 0.019 0.008 0.003 -0.012
(0.040) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Individuals 160 180 196 196 195 195
Tests of instruments and identication
Overidentifying restrictions (Hansen test)
p-value (J statistic) 0.016 0.063 0.118 0.105 0.116 0.116
Under identication (Kleibergen-Paap rank test )
p-value (LM statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identication (Kleibergen-Paap based, for non-i.i.d errors)
Wald F statistic 116.259 156.729 251.93 262.204 193.284 193.284
Endogenous regressors (Anderson-Rubin test)
p-value (chi-2 test) 0.038 0.150 0.129 0.037 0.032 0.032
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See eq. (4)
for details on the IV specication. All estimations consider a constant term, individual
(country-industry) xed e¤ects and year dummies. Statistics are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and also to arbitrary autocorrelation through kernel-based estimations.
Column (6) reports two-step e¢cient generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations.
23
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.25
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess the relevance of the policy option that consists in
fostering innovation and growth through a liberalisation of product markets. To this end,
we analysed the impact of the vertically-induced e¤ects of non-manufacturing regulation
on the innovative process in manufacturing and its further consequences on productivity.
Our empirical strategy was designed to test the inuence of the global process of liberali-
sation fostered by the transformation of key input sectors (mainly network services) in the
OECD on the innovation-productivity relationship. According to most received claims,
this inuence should be positive, especially so in national industries competing at the
leading edge. To perform our analysis, we have split our industry-level sample in order
to consider leader and follower industries at di¤erent levels of the relative multi-factor
productivity.
We do not nd any evidence supporting a positive impact of the above-mentioned
"upstream liberalisation" on the technical progress of manufacturing industries operat-
ing at the leading edge of technology. On the contrary, most estimations performed on
leaders show a signicantly positive impact of traditional forms of PMR on productivity
channelled through the innovative process. Country-industry specicities are important
in explaining these results compared to other works in the related literature. Overall,
this lack of support of mainstream policy views on the matter at hand is reminiscent of
the well-documented theoretical ambiguities in the relationship between PMC and inno-
vation, and of the di¢culties of transposing that theoretical debate into a policy-oriented
one expressed in terms of PMR (especially when vertical relationships are at play).
A currently popular explanation of the productivity lag of Europe vis-à-vis the US
invokes the lack of competition in product market which would be the consequence of too
high a level of regulation (e.g. Aghion 2006). This view states that fostering innovation
and productivity would imply to go beyond the usual innovation policy measures (such
as increasing R&D expenditures and promoting innovative activity), and to implement
policies inuencing the framework in which rms compete. The most common policy
recommandation in this respect is to increase the competitive environment of rms by
liberalising certain key industries such as the non-manufacturing sectors considered in
this paper. Our ndings question the relevance of such policy recommandations. One
may suspect that promoting innovation calls for more targeted policy measures (such as
those proposed, for instance, in Dosi et al., 2006) than simply making rms environ-
ment more competitive. Alternative policies approaches, such as those inspired by the
theory of innovation systems (Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993) or the Triple
Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdor¤, 1998, 2000; Leydesdor¤, 2000; Etzkowitz, 2008), point
out to the necessity of a dedicated innovation policy with public nancial support. In-
deed, these approaches suggest that relationships and linkages between societal actors
(and especially scienceindustrygovernment relationships) are central to the innovation
behaviour and have to be sustained for the public good. Maintaining the Triple Helix
requires government intervention and public funding, and cannot be done through dereg-
ulation alone (Etkowitz, 2008; Simon and Marquès, 2012). Moreover, as shown in our
ndings, a liberalisation policy may prove to be counter-productive for industries close to
the technological frontier. More generally, our results raise doubts on policies that would
subsume research or innovation policy under competition policy.
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A Sample details and descriptive statistics
Table A1. List of industries (2-digit Nace)
Code Description
15t16 Food , beverages and tobacco
17t19 Textiles, textile , leather and footwear
20 Wood and of wood and cork
21t22 Pulp, paper, paper , printing and publishing
23 Coke, rened petroleumm and nuclear fuel
24 Chemicals and chemecal
25 Rubber and plastic
26 Other non-metallic mineral
27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metal
29 Machinery, nec
30t33 Electrical and optical equipment
34t35 Transport equipment
36t37 Manufacturing nec, recycling
Table A2. List of countries
Code Country
AUS Austria
AUT Austria
BEL Belgium
CZE Czech Republic
DNK Denmark
ESP Spain
FIN Finland
FRA France
GER Germany
HUN Hungary
IRL Ireland
ITA Italy
JPN Japan
NLD Netherlands
SWE Sweden
UK United Kingdom
USA United States
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics on main variables
Country MFP REGIMP Patent High Skill Closeness
(1995=100) Intensity Share to the WTF
AUS Mean 101.16 0.08 0.36 8.40 38.75
SD 18.15 0.02 0.62 2.50 20.84
N 338 429 403 312 338
AUT Mean 103.17 0.12 0.89 4.02 35.84
SD 33.04 0.02 1.46 2.05 16.67
N 364 429 403 338 364
BEL Mean 100.59 0.18 0.76 7.63 66.51
SD 19.16 0.03 1.10 3.14 28.79
N 351 429 403 338 351
CZE Mean 122.01 0.13 0.06 6.23 31.12
SD 54.31 0.03 0.12 1.57 20.86
N 169 429 169 143 169
DNK Mean 115.76 0.07 1.20 2.94 45.84
SD 107.43 0.02 2.26 3.12 26.14
N 364 429 403 338 364
ESP Mean 95.30 0.13 0.14 8.06 45.03
SD 14.20 0.03 0.25 4.25 23.78
N 364 429 403 338 364
FIN Mean 88.78 0.10 0.88 17.63 50.49
SD 42.18 0.02 1.41 7.11 26.39
N 494 429 403 468 403
FRA Mean 102.03 0.10 0.94 5.91 52.12
SD 38.86 0.02 1.47 2.29 24.40
N 364 429 403 338 364
GER Mean 111.24 0.11 1.23 6.87 48.69
SD 39.49 0.02 2.00 3.26 20.20
N 221 429 403 195 221
HUN Mean 138.26 0.12 0.07 9.41 34.25
SD 67.26 0.02 0.12 3.24 24.19
N 169 429 208 143 169
IRL Mean 104.84 0.08 0.27 9.35 56.52
SD 23.85 0.02 0.44 3.53 28.45
N 260 396 403 234 260
ITA Mean 84.95 0.15 0.37 3.00 56.30
SD 23.25 0.02 0.55 3.06 31.61
N 494 429 403 468 403
...
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics on main variables (continued)
Country MFP REGIMP Patent High Skill Closeness
(1995=100) Intensity Share to the WTF
JPN Mean 93.11 0.13 0.66 13.10 42.01
SD 28.48 0.02 1.21 6.96 23.57
N 442 429 390 468 390
NLD Mean 97.98 0.07 1.28 3.84 44.62
SD 21.79 0.02 1.95 1.79 31.98
N 377 429 403 351 377
SWE Mean 130.03 0.08 1.13 7.44 43.37
SD 114.41 0.02 1.55 6.11 26.69
N 195 429 403 325 195
UK Mean 90.13 0.09 0.52 5.89 56.81
SD 24.87 0.03 0.76 4.00 27.86
N 494 429 403 468 403
USA Mean 101.92 0.06 0.51 16.11 57.53
SD 41.74 0.01 0.85 9.09 28.18
N 403 429 403 468 403
Total 101.51 0.11 0.60 8.76 48.12
47.51 0.04 1.57 6.77 27.49
6019 9106 9299 7162 5694
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